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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate ) ) 
of ) ) 
ANNIE B. GARDNER, also known~ 
as ANNIE BUTLER <;ARDNER, ) 









CASE NO. 1.4:729 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner r.loria G. Fenton has appealed from the 
District Court's refusal to admit ·the holographic Will of 
Annie B. Gardner to probate and to appoint Pi:ftrick H. Fenton 
as the executor of her estate. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
upon objection of Contestant r.aylord s. r.ardner, the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, with the Honorable Bryant 
H. Croft presiding. denied the Petition of raoria G'. Fenton 
for ap!>Qintment of executor and refused to admit the holo-
graphic Will of Annie B. Gardner to probate because said Will 
fails to make any disposition of decedent's property. The 
court's written Order has been made a part of the files of 
this court. 
1li1' I. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioner-Appellant r,loria r,. Fenton seeks to have 
this court reverse the Order of the lower court and to have 
the decedent's Will admitted to probate. 
STATEMEN~ OF FACTS 
Mrs. Annie B. r,ardner, also known as Annie Butler 
Gardner, died in Salt Lake City, Utah, on ~arch 28, 1976. 
Two months later, Mrs. Gloria r,. Fenton, a daughter of the 
decedent, filed her Petition For Appointment of Executor in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, seeking to have her 
mot~er's ·holographic Will admitted to probate and requesting 
that Petitioner's husband, Patrick H. Fenton, be appointed 
to act as executor of decedent's estate. Among other things, 
the holographic Will contains the following paragraph: 
"In the event my husband precedes me in death I leave 
all I posess (sic) to our daughters Tess Sorensen and 
Gloria Fenton, to be evenlv divided between them, and 
their children shall take over their mothers share if 
either Tess or <;loria have passed on." 
No other part of the Will purports to dispose of 
any of decedent's property, and the Will contains no residuary 
clause. Petitioner has admitted that decedent's husband, 
Wilford w. Gardner, has survived his wife and is still alive 
today. Consequently, the condition precedent set forth in the 
decedent's Will has never been fulfilled. 
On June 15, 1976, Contestant r.aylord s. r,ardner 
filed his Opposition to Probate of Will and to Apoointment of 
Executor, contesting the admission of the Will to probate on 
the ground that it failed to make any disposition of her orop-
~rty because all gifts made therein were contingent upon the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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prior death of testator's husband, which contingency had 
failed to occur. The Contestantalso opposed the ap!'>oint-
ment of Patrick H. Fenton as executor of·the estate for 
statutory and conflict of interest reasons. 
After hearing argument on the issues rai-sed by the-·· 
Contestant's objections to the probate of the r.ardner Ifill r 
Judge Bryant· H. Croft entered an Order denying admission oi- ' 
decedent's holographic Will to probate as a 111atter of law--oe 
the ground that it· failed to make any disposition.. of dece-.-"''<·t 
dent's property because the condition precedent had failed•-::, 
During- the hearing,· the court expreS'Sly decl:ined to hold ~·'''·~~f. . ' 
that the Will· was· invalid and -reserved that quarst:icm· fiJr: '~~"'·.,,·•"·~. 
'.~:~ ... 
some~ later time. (TR8-9) No·~rv1inq waS' made- bp"t:De~~rt :".:v 
on the·qualifications of Patrick lt. Fenton-to Nr'!l'e as the: 
executor of the estate. That issue was moot becaase of the 
ruling of the court-
ARC::UMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT NEVER RULED 
ON THE QUALI~ICATIONS OF THE 
EXECUTOR BECAUSE THE WILL ITSELF 
WAS NOT ADMITTED TO PROBATE. 
The Appellant argues under Point I of her brief that 
the court failed to make any findings as to the qualifications 
of Patrick H. Fenton to serve as executor of decedent's es:t.ate. 
we must agree that no findings were made, but we hasten to add 
that no findings were necessary. The issues pertaining to the 
qualifications of the proposed executor to serve in that cap-
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the Will to probate. Since the court held that decedent's 
holographic Will failed to make any effective disposition of 
her property and that probate would have no useful purpose, 
there was no need to deal further with the qualifications of 
Patrick H. Fenton to serve as executor of the estate. No 
executor was needed in this instance, and no findings were 
necessary in this regard. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO RULE 
ON THE VALIDITY O~ THE HOLOGRAPHIC 
WILL. 
During the hearing held by the court on July 15, 
1976, the court responded to some reference to "invalidity" 
of the Will in the following language: 
"THE COURT: Even if there were, I am not satisfied 
while this Will under my ruling leaves nothing to be 
probated, it doesn't mean that it is not a valid Will. 
In this Will, she says 'This Will revokes all former 
Wills,' which might very well have that effect if 
there is a prior Will that she made. The fact that 
this Will fails for the reason I have stated, doesn't 
mean that the Will itself is void. And therefore, 
that revocation of all prior Wills might well have 
accomplished that very fact. But that isn't before 
me and I won't purport to make any ruling on that." 
Because there may be other Wills that would be 
governed by decedent's declaration that all prior Wills are 
revoked, the court declined to rule that the holographic Will 
was invalid. The court limited its ruling to the question of 
whether or not decedent's Will effectively disposed of any of 
her property. Whether that limited ruling of the court was 
proper is the issue now on appeal before this body. Ne think 
the Supreme Court should limit its consideration of this 
matter to that issue. 
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The Appellant argues in Point I of her brief that 
the court should have found that the Will was invalid before 
refusing to admit it to probate. This argument has no merit 
because the document may have been proper in every ~if1"except 
in the disposition of decedent's property. The-fo~ties 
surrounding the preparation of the document may have~·., 
fully complied with, a~d it could otherwise have :beefi prO.ed 
and adm~tted to probate. The fact that the contin~ ~·": 
vented any disposition of decedent's 
arily invalidate the Will; it merely 
probate purposes. The court gave· full effect l:c~Blil!itilJI!•••• 
of the testatrix in making its decision to-'J:lli~~~!:\ 
• 0 • ....... -.--.~··1~ 
of the Will. No other construction was posSible; UOO,• ;,.-~~·. ;:<. • ... 
circumstanc;.es. As demon~t:r:ated in othe~:·~rts of t)µs :~J;..\, 
~ ,. .. . . . -~-. . 
the Will may be valid, but the-property iltUSt still be)I}._. 
tributed in accordance with Utah laws of intestacy • 
POINT III. 
CONTESTANT HAS NO OBLif'..ATION-
TO PETITION FOR N?POINTMENT 
OF AN AD~.INISTRATOR IN THIS"· 
MATTER. 
• : J._ 
The Appellant seems to place some significance on 
the fact that the Appellee has not filed a Petition For Ad!nin-
istration or for probate of any other Will in conneet1on with 
Mrs. Gardner's death. She notes in· Point· II of her brief that 
an alternate.petition has been filed by herself and her sister 
Tess r.. Sorensen requesting that they be appointed as co-
administratrixes in the event that a valid Will is not forth-
coming. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Of course, the Contestant has no obligation to 
file any petition for administration in this matter. Under 
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 75-4-1, 
administration of an estate of a person who died without a 
Will must be granted to certain relatives in order of 
priority. The Contestant is a person of low priority under 
the terms of that statute, while the daughters of the dece-
~ent, who. have already filed their petition for such adminis-
tration, are given high priority for this purpose. The Con-
testant would accomplish nothing of value in filing his 
petition for issuance of letters of administration under 
the circumstances. 
POINT IV. 
THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 74-2-10 
DO NOT GOVERN THE CIRCUMSTA..~CES 
OF THIS CASE. 
Appellant asserts in her brief that the court has 
acted contrary to the provisions of Uta~ Code Annotated, 1953, 
Title 74-2-10 in refusing to admit decedent's Will to probate. 
That statute reads as follows: 
"Of two modes of interpreting a Will, that is to be 
preferred that will prevent a total intestacy." 
Appellant's argument assumes that the District Court 
was dealing with a problem of interpretation when it denied 
admission of decedent's Will to probate. In reality, there 
was no question of interpretation facing the court when the 
rulin~ was made. The language of the Will is clear and un-
equivocal. All gifts are contingent upon the prior death of 
decedent's husband, Wilford w. t:;ardner. Since that contin-
gency had failed in its entirety, then the Nill did not 
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accomplish its purpose. It did not d~spose of the decedent's 
property, and admission to probate would have served no use-
ful purpose. No other construction was possible under these 
circumstances. 
In referring to the purpose of the above statute, 
the Supreme Court of Utah once made the followin~ stat;~eut 
in the case of Inre Beal's Estate, 117-U. 189, 214 P.2d 525U950); 
case. 
"The rule that testacy rther than intestacy is · 
preferred does not relieve courts from· the-·-obl:i-··-
gation to construe the language of the Will accord-
ing to the legal effect of the word.s used. 31 ' ·' ~i 
That statement seems to·be appropri:a~ 'in 'l!!ffe 
. ·~·· ~ ·;,.. . ' 
Appellant also argues trat the Dist:'rict·~-IJ 
. . . , ·,('· -
ignored the mandate of Title-74-2-35 in denyi~r'dba'lle of 
decedent's holographic Will. This statute deals w'itfi''lld~~ 
ments mad~ during the life of the testatrix. Since the 
condition.'-precedent has prevented ~ gift from takill9 effeet. 
the issues about her advancements to her· oheirs are ~eign 
to. this appeal. Under Utah law; as set:··0 forth below, .it is 
evident that decedent's estate must be distributed·in·accord~ 
and with the laws of intestacy and the advancements would 
have no relevance to such distribution. 
POINT V. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
ADMISSION OF THE GARDNER HOLOGRAPHIC 
WILL TO PROBATE. 
Under Utah law, as set forth in UCA1:,;.Title 74-2-30, 
a condition precedent in a Will is one which is required to be 
fulfilled before a particular disposition takes. effect. Title 
.. ~ '· 
ii 
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74-2-31 states that where a testamentary disposition is made 
upon a condition precedent, nothing vests until the condition 
is fulfilled. 
In the matter now before the court, all gifts made 
by Mrs. Gardner in her Will were contingent upon the prior 
death of her husband, Wilford w. r.ardner, who has survived 
her to this date. The condition precedent has never been 
performed and can never be performed. Therefore, the dispos-
ition of decedent's entire estate has failed, and none of 
her property has been disposed of by her Will. For this 
reason, the adllission of the Will to probate would have had 
no useful purpose. It is evident from the above that the 
court was following established Utah law when it refused to 
,admit the ·Gardner Will to probate. 
In Larsen vs.Paskett,-29 Utah 2d 360, 510 P2d 520, 
the Su~reme Court of Utah had a previous occasion to deal with 
the "vesting" concept of probate law. The words of the court. 
in that case are of assistance to us in this matter. The 
language of the court is as follows: 
nBut the trial court adopted the view, with which we 
are in accordf. tha,t the rule a,s to .i.rrunediate vestin9 
of prope;i:ty in tne heir or the devisee upon the dece.,. 
d.ent' s death does not a,pply where it appears from the 
Wi.ll that the tei;tatrix had a different purpose in mind 
and the Will sta,tes conditions precedent to such vest..-
ing." 
There can be no doubt tha.t ownership of decedent's 
prope~ty never vested in anyone as a result of the terms of 
her Will. The court and the parties must now follow other 
avenues in distributing decedent's estate. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Under the provisions of Title 74-1-1, any part 
of decedent's estate not disposed of by Will is succeeded 
to as provided in Chapter 4 of Title 74. Under that chapter, 
the legislature has set forth the manner in which property 
must be distributed in the absence of a Will or.marriage 
contract. In other words, when decedent's property is not 
disposed· of by Will, then her property should_ .be distributed 
to her heirs in accordance with the Utah laws of intestacy. 
The Appellant now has every rig_ht to go forward 
with the probate of her mother's estate. She and her sister 
have already filed a.Petition to have .themselves appointed 
as co-administratrixes to administer their mother's estate. 
At their request, a hearing on that Petition has been post-
poned pending the outcome of this Appeal. There is n9 re~son 
why the District Court cannot go forward with an. intestate 
probate at this time. 
Utah law is not unique on the question of contingen-
cies. The courts of other states have held that where a 
contingent gift fails, such gift falls back into the estate 
of the decedent to be distributed under the laws of intestacy 
in the absence of a residuary clause. See Nichols vs. First 
security National Bank of Baker, 264 P2d 451, 191 Ore. 659. 
The Arizona courts have held that where a contingent 
beneficiary under a Will has pre-deceased the testatrix, the 
Will was inoperative as to the portion belonging to the deceased's 
beneficiary, and such lapsed share remained undispo.sed of under 
the Will. see In re Jackson's Estate, 464 P2d 1011, 11 Ariz. 
App. 424. 
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our sister state of Idaho held in 1963 that prop-
erty not disposed of by a Will containing no residuary 
, ~"' · clause must descend in accordance with Idaho laws of succession. 
·-.' 
;:'·see Iii re Corwin's Estate, 383 P2d 339, which also held that 
~~-·court may not speculate as to what the testator intended 
:h1'· tm"deCJ.are:·in his Will, but must determine what he meant by 
.·· i.1~, 'the Wbrds-aetually used therein. In Idaho, as in Utah, ali 
.yr presumptions and auxiliarly rules applicable to probate matters 
.... 
·'if•/• 
,L f>':: l!it"e subordinate to this cardinal rule. 
·'. ·,·'"f-t111' llfpellant insists that the court failed to give ··r.:~:t 
t,.;-,· oie•t•S•m•• t:D t:lle intention of the testatrix in refusing to 
~: ,:, 
N ~ •· 
-~>admit: tile C8rdner Will to probate. Again, we stress that 
' .. 
- ! "'this case is not a matter of simple interpretation of the 
contents of a Will. The question is whether a condition 
·4.·~ precedent to the granting of any gifts was fulfilled, enabling 
the distribution of decedent's estate to be made in any 
·'K~F·. event. Since the condition precedent never took place, the 
court had no duty to look at the intention of the testatrix 
regarding what should have been done if the condition had been 
fulfilled. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly applied Utah law in 
denying admission of the Gardner Will to probate. For reasons 
set forth herein, it's ruling should be affirmed. 
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DATED this /cf'~day ol: November, 1976. 
for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Two copies of the above and foregoing Respondent's 
Brief was mailed to Patrick H. Fenton, Attorney for Appellant, 
13 West Hoover Avenue, Cedar City, Ut~4702, by United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, thi~~ay of November, 1976. 
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